The Matsumoto-Imai public key scheme was developed to provide very fast signatures. It is based on substitution polynomials over GF( 2 m ). This paper shows in two ways that the Matsumoto-Imai public key scheme is very easy to break. In the faster of the two attacks the time to cryptanalyze the scheme is about proportional to the binary length of the public key. This shows that Matsumoto and Imai greatly overestimated the security of their scheme.
THE MATSUMOTO-IMAI PUBLIC KEY SCHEME
The Matsumoto-Imai [7] enciphering is defined over GF ( 2 m ), the message space. The public key is a substitution polynomial [1] :
e i X i . For a message Y, which belongs to GF( 2 m ), the ciphertext is E(Y). In order to have a "short" public key and to be able to encipher rapidly, most of the e i must be zero. To that end, E(X) is constructed as E(X) ≡ a(b + X α ) β modulo (X 2 m + X), where the Hamming weight [2] of β is r. One can then easily prove that only 2 r coefficients e i will be non-zero. If r is small (e.g., 14, as suggested in [7] ), the public key is not too long. E(X) in expanded form is made public, while a, b, α, and β are kept secret in order to be able to decipher fast. In order to specify E(X), the field GF( 2 m ) has to be made public also, and r can be deduced from the number of non-zero coefficients. Therefore we have:
Remark: One can consider that m and r are given, so these values do not have to be deduced.
MAIN PRINCIPLES FOR THE CRYPTANALYSIS OF THE MATSUMOTO-IMAI PUBLIC

KEY SCHEME
In order to allow a unique deciphering, the system designer has to chose gcd (α, 2 m − 1 ) = gcd (β, 2 m − 1 ) = 1, and so from now on we will assume these conditions hold. The following theorems help to explain the cryptanalysis.
Theorem 1: If the public key is constructed as mentioned above and β is written as
then the exponents of X with non-zero coefficients can be expressed as
and their corresponding coefficients as
Proof: Using the construction algorithm for public keys and (1), we have It is sufficient to find any one of these equivalent (a, b, α, β) in order to break the scheme. To simplify the description, all these equivalent keys will be called the secret key. We will sometimes suppose in the paper that u 1 = 0, which by Corollary 1 entails no loss of generality. Proof: Can be verified easily using Theorem 1. Proof: In view of Theorem 1 this subset is actually present in the list of exponents. Let now γ be any other element of the list, say γ ≡ ( 2
..,u r } with s ≥ 2. We shall prove that the list contains fewer than r elements of the If one finds an α 1 which satisfies the above property, then α will be chosen equal to α 1 . The calculation of β is then trivial; it is in fact obtained at the same time as α. Once α and β have been found, a and b are calculated using Corollary 2. As a consequence of Theorem 2 and the remark at the beginning of this section, one does not need to check that the obtained α is correct! Two algorithms will now be presented which find α and β. The first algorithm uses the calculation of the inverse of elements modulo 2 m − 1. The second one is based on shift operations and sorting algorithms.
CRYPTANALYSIS USING INVERSE CALCULATION
The Principles Of The Algorithm
Exponents of X with non-zero coefficients will be written as i
is not equal to one, a wrong choice for α was made. If
m − 1 ) = 1 then several techniques can be used to find β. In one of them the cryptanalyst first
In view of Theorem 2, if r values of f l are powers of 2, then i k is α, and β is the sum of these r values of f l .
If no such r values are found, continue the exhaustive search. Because r is small this exhaustive search is fast.
Speed Evaluation Of The Algorithm
The number of elementary steps (such as additions and shifts) used in the above cryptanalytic algorithm will be analyzed. First the complexity of each step will be obtained; next this value will be multiplied by the number of times each step is executed. 
CRYPTANALYSIS USING SHIFT OPERATIONS
The Principles Of The Algorithm
In the second method of attack we partition the exponents of X with nonzero coefficients into sets S p .
Two different exponents i k and i l of X, with non-zero coefficients, will belong to the same set exactly one S p , which we call S r , will contain r elements. Using Corollary 2, any element of S r can be chosen as α. Identifying the required rotation operations for going from α to obtain the other elements of S r , we obtain β. We now describe how the above ideas can be carried out. The speed of the algorithm will be discussed later. 
Speed Evaluation Of The Algorithm
